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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
§ 78-2-2(3)0) (2002) (appeal from final judgment).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:
Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment in favor ofPlaintiff because
a genuine issue of material facts exists as to Plaintiff being estopped from collecting the
debt in question? (Issue Preserved: R. 554-570, attached at Addendum 1)
Standard of Appellate Review: In reviewing a summary judgment the Court
examines the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, and view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, ~~ 2, 13, 70 P.3d 904.
The Court will allow the summary judgment to stand "only if the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein &
Fielding, 909 P.2d 283, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
ISSUE II:
Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff because
a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff actually charged off the
debt in question? (Issue Preserved: R. 554-570, attached at Addendum 1)
Standard of Appellate Review: In reviewing a summary judgment the Court
examines the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, and view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
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party. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, ,-r,-r 2, 13, 70 P.3d 904.
The Court will allow the summary judgment to stand "only if the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw on the undisputed facts." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein &
Fielding, 909 P.2d 283, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature ofthe Case
This is a collection case filed by Zions Bank ("ZB") seeking to collect on a
$250,000 promissory note executed by Appellant on December 29,2006.
B. Course ofProceedings
ZB filed this action on October 9,2014. (Rec. 1-3) On November 7,2014, Crapo
answered the complaint. (Rec. 18) The parties conducted all fact discovery through
June 2015.
On July 27,2015, ZB filed its motion for summary judgment. (Rec.229) On
July 30,2015, Crapo filed a cross motion for summary judgment. (Rec. 318) Both
parties filed opposition memoranda to the cross motions for summary judgment. (Rec.
375; 446) On January 8, 2016, the trial court conducted oral arguments on the cross
motions for summary judgment. (Rec. 793)
On January 22,2016, the trial court granted ZB's motion for summary judgment
and denied Crapo's motion for summary judgment. (Rec.554) On January 25,2016, ZB
filed its motion for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. (Rec.571)
On February 8, 2016, Crapo filed his notice of non-opposition to the motion for
attorneys' fees and costs. (Rec.600) On February 8, 2016, the trial court entered a final
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judgment against Crapo, awarding ZB a total of $320,704.61 in damages, attorneys' fees,
and costs. (Rec. 610)
On March 9, 2016, Crapo filed his amended notice of appeal with the trial court.
(Rec. 648, 653)
C. Disposition at Trial Court
On January 22,2016, the trial court entered its order granting ZB's motion for
summary judgment and denying Crapo's motion for summary judgment. (Rec.554)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On December 29,2006, Crapo entered into a Home Equity Line Credit
Agreement and Disclosure (the "Note") with ZB in the principal amount of $250,000.00.
(Rec.402)
2. Crapo defaulted under the Note. (Rec. 2, ~ 6)
3. On October 20, 2010, ZB sent a demand letter to Crapo, requesting
payment for the full amount of the loan. (Rec. 403; 421)
4. The following month, in November 2010, ZB sent a second letter to Crapo
demanding payment. (Rec. 403; 421-22)
5. Between sending these letters in 2010 and filing this lawsuit in 2014, ZB
took no steps to collect the amounts allegedly owing under the Loan. (Rec. 403; 421-22)
6. During that time of inaction, on or about January 6, 2011, ZB charged off
the Loan by approving an internal "Charge OffRequest". (Rec. 428) A true and correct
legible copy of the Charge OffRequest is attached as an addendum hereto as
Addendum 2. (Rec. 428; 550-551)
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7. The internal Charge OffRequest states:
[Crapo] has indicated he wants to repay the loan but does not have the
financial means to do so at this time. It is recommended this loan be
charged off due to the lack of collateral and transferred to Recovery
Department for further collection efforts. An asset search will be
completed to determine if assets exist to attach to a judgment.
(Rec. 428; Addendum 2; 563)
8. Three years later, in January 2014, Crapo received a 1099-C Cancellation
of Debt IRS form (the "1099-C") from Zions. (Rec. 403; 414)
9. The present lawsuit was not filed until October 9, 2014. (Rec. 1-3)
10. A 1099-C Form is sent to a debtor when "an applicable financial entity (a
lender) has discharged (cancelled or forgiven) a debt" owed by the person who receives
the form. (emphasis added). (Rec. 414)
11. In Box 4 of the 1099-C, Zions described the purpose of the discharge as
"FORGIVEN DEBT AMT 3 YRS NO PAYMENT." (Rec.414)
12. Upon receipt of this form, the IRS informed Crapo that he was "required to
include the discharged amount in [his] income" and that a failure to do so would result in
"a negligence penalty or other sanction." (Rec. 414)
13. As a result, Crapo included the full $250,000.00 value ofthe Loan as
income in his 2013 tax return. (Rec.403)
14. The 1099-C also had tax consequences for Zions. (Rec. 420)
15. In Zions' 2013 financial disclosures, Zions' assets are reduced by the
amount of "loan losses," such as the amount of the Loan. (Rec. 420; 430-438)
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16. Moreover, Zions' income was reduced by the amount of "loan losses," such
as the amount of the Loan. (Rec. 420; 430-438)
17. The 1099-C decreased Zions' tax burden while simultaneously increasing
Crapo's tax burden for the tax year 2013. (Rec. 403; 420; 430-438)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Crapo created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether ZB is estopped from
collecting the debt in this case. This dispute of fact consisted of ZB's approved Charge
Off Request dated January 6, 2011 (Rec. 428 and Addendum 2), the 1099-C issued by ZB
to Crapo in January 2014 stating "FORGIVEN DEBT", and no action taken by ZB from
November 2010 to October 9,2014, almost four years, to collect on the note. The trial
court should have denied ZB' s motion for summary judgment on the basis of these
factual disputes. This Court should reverse the trial court's order granting summary
judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for a trial on the merits.
I. CRAPO CREATED A GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
WHETHER ZB WAS ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING THE NOTE.
Under Utah law, a party is estopped from pursuing its claims if the following three
elements are met:
(l) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent
with a claim later asserted;
(2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on
the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to
act; and
(3) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or
failure to act.
Youngbloodv. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28,,-r 14, 158 P.3d 1088.
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In this case, Crapo created a genuine dispute ofmaterial fact as to whether ZB is
estopped from asserting its claims and collecting the value of the Note from Crapo.
A. A Genuine Dispute ofMaterial Fact Exists Relating to the First Element 0/
Estoppel
Crapo demonstrated a genuine factual dispute regarding the first element of
estoppel. In this regard, Crapo demonstrated that ZB took no actions to collect on the
Note for four years. (Rec. 403; 420-21) Crapo testified in his declaration that for the time
period ofNovember 2010 to the date of filing this action, ZB had taken no action against
Crapo to collect the debt. (Rec.403) ZB confirmed its failure to take action to collect
the note, testifying that it sent Crapo demand for payment in November 2010, but did not
take action that Crapo would have been aware of until it filed this lawsuit in
October 2014. (Rec.420-21)
When ZB communicated with Crapo more than 3 years after demanding payment
of the Note, the communication was in the 1099-C form in January 2014. The record
shows that in January 2014, ZB sent the 1099-C to Crapo, affirmatively stating that the
Note was "FORGIVEN DEBT." (Rec.414) Moreover, three years before issuing the
1099-C, ZB internally stated its intent to charge off the debt, albeit stating that it would
conduct an asset search to determine if any judgment could be collected. (Rec. 428) The
date of this Charge OffRequest is January 2011, three years prior to ZB issuing the
1099-C stating the debt was forgiven. The trial court should have denied summary
judgment in light of these disputed facts.
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B. A Genuine Dispute ofMaterial Fact Exists in Relation to the Second
Element ofEstoppel
Crapo created a genuine dispute of material fact in relation to his actions in
reliance on ZB's statements, admissions, and acts. Because ZB told Crapo that the Note
was "FORGIVEN DEBT," (Rec. 414), Crapo included the full value of the Note in his
income for the tax year 2013. (Rec. 403) Importantly, the only communication Crapo had
from the bank prior to the lawsuit being filed in October 2014 consisted of two demand
letters four years earlier in October and November 2010, and the 1099-C sent to Crapo in
January 2014. Whether Crapo's inclusion of the "forgiven debt" on his income tax
returns constituted reasonable reliance on ZB' s issuance of the 1099-C is a question of
fact for the jury. Moreover, because ZB had discharged the Note, taken no steps to
collect on the Note for four years, and told Crapo the Note was "FORGIVEN DEBT,"
Crapo has not made additional payments nor has he maintained the financial flexibility to
do so. A genuine dispute of material fact therefore exists as to whether Crapo took
reasonable actions based on ZB's affirmations.
In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court relied heavily on the
reasoning that Crapo failed to satisfy the second element of estoppel because ZB never
communicated any intent to discharge the debt at issue, and therefore given the lack of
communication or other indication that the debt had been discharged, Crapo's inclusion
of the 1099-C amount in his income taxes was not reasonable. (R.566-68)
The trial court's reasoning ignores the language in the 1099-C, which clearly and
plainly communicated that Crapo's debt had been "forgiven." Importantly, by issuing the
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1099-C, Zions communicated much more than just a general potential discharge of debt
by stating in Box 4 of the 1099-C that the debt at issue was "FORGIVEN DEBT". This
information clearly raises an issue of fact as to what ZB intended in communicating to
Crapo that the debt was "forgiven," and whether ZB still intended to collect the debt.
The trial court should have therefore denied ZB's motion for summary judgment.
The anti-waiver provision in the Note likewise does not prevent ZB's inaction
between November 2010 and October 2014 from being an issue of fact relevant to
Crapo's reliance. The anti-waiver provision states:
Delay in Enforcement. We may delay or waive the enforcement of any of
our rights under this Agreement without losing that right or any other right.
Ifwe delay or waive our rights, we may enforce that right at any time in the
future without advance notice. For example, not terminating your account
for non-payment will not be a waiver of our right to terminate your account
in the future ifyou have not paid.
(Rec.564)
While by itself the mere delay in enforcing a right may prevent such delay from
creating an issue of fact, this case does not involve a mere delay. Importantly, the delay
was coupled with ZB 's affirmative statement to Crapo that his debt had been forgiven.
This statement was never explained away by ZB that the 1099-C was only
administratively required to put ZB into compliance with IRS regulations, or that ZB was
still enforcing its rights under the Note despite having communicated that the debt had
been forgiven. The dispositive question in regards to the second element of estoppel is
whether Crapo's actions were reasonable on the basis ofZB 's statement, admission, act
or failure to act. Here, not only was there a failure to act, there was a statement or
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admission that the debt had been forgiven. Therefore, the anti-waiver provision in the
Note should not prevent ZB's delay from being an issue of fact.
C. A Genuine Dispute ofMaterial Fact Exists in Relation to the Third Element
ofEstoppel
Crapo created a genuine dispute of material fact in relation to the third element of
estoppel by showing that he will be injured if ZB is allowed to contradict and repudiate
its prior affirmations. Crapo has already paid taxes on the full value of the Note. (Re.
403) Furthermore, Crapo has relied upon ZB' s affirmations and has taken no steps to pay
the Note or to create the financial ability to pay the Note. Therefore, should ZB be
allowed to retract its prior acts and statements, Crapo would be harmed by paying the
value of a Note he reported to the IRS as income and that he understood to have been
forgiven.
Having created a genuine dispute ofmaterial fact in relation to the elements of
estoppel, the Court should have denied ZB's motion for summary judgment and
conducted a trial on the merits. This Court should therefore reverse the trial court's
decision and remand this case for trial.
II. REGARLDESS OF ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN MAJORITY AND
MINORITY COURTS RELATIVE TO THE ISSUANCE OF A l099-C,
ZB WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
ON THE BASIS OF F.D.IC. v. CASHION.
In granting summary judgment in favor of ZB, the trial court expressly adopted the
view ofthe Fourth Circuit Court ofAppeals in F.D.1.C. v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169 (4th Cir.
2013), which held that mere issuance of a 1099-C does not constitute a discharge of debt.
In expressly adopting the view in Cashion, the trial court expressly rejected the view of
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the Arizona Court ofAppeals in AmTrust Bankv. Fossett, 224 PJd 935 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2009), which held that issuance of a 1099-C constitutes prima facie evidence of
discharge. Without needing to determine which side of the fence Utah falls in relation to
views adopted by either Cashion or AmTrust, the Cashion decision should not have been
the legal basis for granting summary judgment in favor of ZB.
Cashion is easily distinguishable from the present case. In Cashion, the key to the
court's decision in deciding that the bare issuance of a 1099-C does not prove discharge
of debt was that the debtor's "sole evidence" of the discharge was the 1099-C and that
Cashion provided no "contextual clues needed to decide between" whether his debt was
discharged or not. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
The facts in this case are vastly different. Here, Crapo provided the trial court
with additional proof ofthe discharge, giving the trial court ample "contextual clues" that
a genuine factual dispute existed in relation to the Note being forgiven. For example, not
only did Crapo receive a 1099-C, the 1099-C contained an affirmative statement by ZB
describing the Note as "FORGIVEN DEBT." On top of that, ZB discharged Crapo's debt
and took no steps to collect on the Note for four years. While the internal charge off
request stated that ZB would conduct an asset and determine whether a judgment could
be collected, this was never communicated to Crapo, and this determination for charge
offwas made more than 3 years before ZB expressly told Crapo the debt had been
forgiven, and 3.5 years before ZB actually filed suit to collect the Note. Moreover, ZB
was able to reduce its tax burden as a result of issuing the 1099-C, while simultaneously
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increasing Crapo's. Taken together, these facts provide sufficient "contextual clues" that
render Cashion inapplicable and require a reversal of the trial court's summary judgment.
The cases cited to by the trial court to further support its grant of summary
judgment actually support Crapo's position in this appeal. The trial court's supportive
case law appears at page 558 of the record. The majority of these cases demonstrate that
issuance of a 1099-C, along with additional evidence, will, at the very least, give rise to
disputed factual issues surrounding discharge of debt. See Rec. at 558, citing
Hart v. Credit Servo Co., Inc., 2014 WL 5293600, *3 (D. Colo. 2014) ("Plaintiffs mere
receipt of a 1099-C form did not constitute extinguishment of his underlying debt.");
Mennes V. CaptialOne, NA., 2014 WL 1767079, at *6 (W.D. Wis. 2014) ("Given that
the regulation requires the filing of Form 1099-C regardless whether the debt has actually
been discharged, and that actual discharge of the debt is only one of the identifiable
events that triggers the filing of a 1099-C form, I find the IRS interpretation persuasive
and agree with the majority of courts addressing this issue that without additional
evidence, the filing of a 1099-C form does not by itself evidence debt cancellation as a
matter oflaw."); Ware v. Bank ofAm. Corp., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2014)
("Plaintiff has failed to point the court to any documentary or testamentary evidence, or
binding or even persuasive legal authority to support his claim that the 1099-C
extinguished his obligation to pay the debt, or that Defendant cancelled or forgave the
debt ...").
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CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment in
favor of ZB and remand this case back to the trial court for a trial on the merits.
DATED this 24th day ofAugust, 2016.
Richard J. g
Attorneys for Appellant
WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that this brief complies with the word limitations in Utah R.
App. P. 24(f) and contains 3,318 words according to the word count function in
Microsoft Word 2010.
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ADDENDA
ADDENDUMl
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
FlLID DlPiley .IU8'
,Thtrc1 Judle\a' District
, JAN 22 20~'6,"
SALT LAKE cou-=-='''6_
8y_
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHAYNE D. CRAPO,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING THE
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No.: 140907019
Judge: Barry G. Lawrence
Plaintiffasserts a deficiency claim against the Defendantfor the amountdue and owing under
a note - $250,000 plus interest, costs and fees. Discovery has closed, and both parties have filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that the facts are undisputed that $250,000
remains due and owing from the Defendant and seeks a judgment against him in the amount of
$289,069.86 through May 31, 2015, plus interest of $18.77 per day thereafter.' In response,
Defendant does not dispute that he has failed to pay the amount due under the note, but asserts
defenses based on the Plaintiffs alleged discharge ofthe obligation. Defendantprimarily argues that
by virtue of the Plaintiff issuing a 1099~C tax form to him for the 2013 tax year, the Plaintiff is
deemed to have discharged his debt and/or is barred by the doctrines ofwaiver and estoppel from
pursuing its claims.
1 Those amounts were supported by the Affidavit ofRex Goodwin and were not disputed by Defendant.
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Accordingly, the principal question for the Court is this: What effect does the issuance ofthe
1099-C have on Plaintiff's claims? On one hand, Plaintiff argues that the 1099-C is simply a tax
reporting tool and does not effectuate a discharge ofthe indebtedness, and thus Defendant's defense
are unsupported and summary judgment is warranted.' On the other hand, Defendant initially
seemed to argue that the 1099-C precludes Plaintiff from asserting a claim as a matter of law.
However, even the cases Defendant relies upon suggest that the 1099-C form only constitutes some
evidence of a discharge, creating a question of fact for the jury; it does not in and of itself create a
legal bar to collection. The Court concludes - based on the applicable tax rules, I.R.S. authorities,
and persuasive majority ofthe case law - that the I099-C does not effectuate or otherwise constitute
evidence ofa discharge. That, plus the dearth ofany other evidence supporting an alleged discharge
by Plaintiff, supports summary judgment in favor ofPlaintiff.
L. The l099-C Form and Pertinent Regulations
It is undisputed that Defendant failed to make any payments to Plaintiffbeginning in 2010.
In early 2014, Plaintiffissued a Form 1099-C to Defendant for the 2013 tax year. That form, entitled
"Cancellation ofDebt" ("Fonn"), stated $250,000 as the "amount ofdebt discharged." Notably, the
reason given for the code was signified as "Identifiable Event Code 'H'." The instructions on the
face ofthe Form provided the following guidance to the Defendant:
You received this form because a Federal Government agency or an applicable financial
entity (lender) has discharged (canceled or forgiven) a debt you owed or because an
identifiable event has occurred that either is or is deemed to be a discharge ofa debt of$600
or more. . .. if an identifiable event has occurred but the debt has not actually been
2 Plaintiff also argues that there could not have been a discharge because any discharge would constitute a
"credit agreement" subject to the statute of frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1 )(f). Defendant counters that only a
"note or memorandum ofthe agreement," is required (id.), which is satisfied by the l099-C Form and the Charge Off
request. Because the Court concludes that there was no evidence of a discharge, it need not address this argument.
-2-
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discharged, then include any discharge debt in your income in the year that it is actually
discharged, unless an exception or exclusionapplies to you in that year.
(Def.'s Mem. In Supp. of Summ. J. Ex. A2 (Cancellationof Debt » (emphasis added.)
This cancellationprocess was donepursuantto 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-1. That regulationsets
forth the reporting requirements for a lender as follows:
(a) Reporting reqnirement-{l) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this
section, any applicable entity (as defined in section 6050P(c)(1) that discharges an
indebtednessof anyperson (withinthe meaningof section 7701(a)(1» ofat least$600during
a calendaryear must file an informationreturn on Form 1099-C with the InternalRevenue
Service.Solely for purposes ofthe reporting requirements of section 6050Pand this section,
a discharge ofindebtedness is deemed to have occurred, except as provided in paragraph
(b)(3) of this section, if and only if there has occurred an identifiable event described in
paragraph (b)(2) ofthis section, whether or not an actual discharge ofindebtedness has
occurred on or before the date on which the identifiable event has occurred.
ld. (emphasis added.) Thus, consistent with the Form itself, two things are clear: First, that the
purpose ofthis regulation and documentis to effectI.R.S. tax reporting requirements. Second,that
a dischargeof indebtedness for tax purposes includesboth actual discharges as well as otherevents
that are not actual discharges.
26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-l subpart (b)(2) lists the eight recognized "identifiable events;" seven
of which appear to reflect actual discharges, including: 1) a discharge in bankruptcy, id. at sec.
1.6050P-l(b)(2)(A); 2) a "cancellation or extinguishment" for various reasons, id. at 1.6050P-1
(b)(2)(B), (C), (D) and (E); and 3) "a dischargeof indebtedness"based on an agreementorbased on
the creditor's decision to discharge the debt." ld. at sec. 1.6050P-l(b)(2)(F) and (G). The eighth
identifiable event, stated in sub-paragraphH, allowsa lender to identify the reason for the issuance
ofthe 1099-Cwhere there has not been an actual discharge:
(H) In the case of an entity describedin section 6050P(c)(2)(A) through (C), the expiration
ofthe non-payment testing period,as describedin § 1.6050P-l(b)(2)(iv).
-3-
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26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-l(b)(2)(H)(emphasis added.). The Form Plaintiff issued in this case clearly
and unambiguously reflects "Identifiable Event Code 'H'," referring to the expiration ofa "testing
period," as opposed to an actualdischarge, cancellation or extinguishment.
II. Case Law Interpreting the Form 1099-C
Each party has cited to case law supporting their position. Plaintiff asks the Court to adopt
the majority position, the lead case for which is F.D.Ie. v, Cashion, 720 FJd 169 (4th Cir. 2013).
There, also on summary judgment, the court addressed the issue whether "the introduction into
evidence ofthe 1099-e Form create[d] a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether the Note had
been cancelled or assigned." Id. at 177. The court concluded:
Theplain language ofthe regulation leads us to conclude thatfiling a Form 1099-e is a
creditor'srequiredmeans ofsatisfying a reporting obligation to theIRS; it is not a means
of accomplishing an actual discharge of debt, nor is it required only where an actual
discharge has already occurred.
* * *
The IRS, the administrative agency charged with the obligation of implementing IRC §
6050P through its regulations, thus treats the Form 1099-e as a means for satisfying a
reporting obligation and not as an instrument effectuating a discharge of debt or preventing
a creditor from seeking payment on a debt. Moreover, as the IRS correctly noted in the
foregoing Information Letters, nothing in the relevant statute or regulations prohibits
collection following the filing of a Form 1099-e.
Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
In Cashion, the debtor argued, just as the debtor argues here, that the l099-C Form
constitutes prima facie evidence of an intent to discharge the loan, and that it would be up to the
lender to demonstrate a contrary intention, thereby creating a factual dispute. The court in Cashion
rejected that view, which it referred to as the view of "a small minorityof the lower courts," Id. at
178.
-4-
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Notably, the court in Cashion also relied on the IRS's own interpretation ofthe regulations
as manifested in two IRS Information Letters:
In the first, the IRS addressed a creditor's concern that filing the Form 1099-C would
constitute a written admission that it had discharged the debt and would therefore make
debtors unwilling to pay on their obligations, Citing subsection (a) of the regulations
discussed above, the IRS responded that it "does not view a Form 1099-C as an admission
by the creditor that it has discharged the debt and can no longer pursue collection." I.R.S.
Info. 2005-{)207. In the second letter, the IRS assured a concerned creditor that filing a Form
1099-C satisfies the reporting requirements of statute and implementing regulations, neither
ofwhich "prohibit collection activity after a creditor reports by filing a Form 1099-C.» I.R.S.
Info.200S-{)208.
ld. at 179.
This Court, having reviewed the IRS regulations, the language of the IRS letters, and the
Form 1099-C and its underlying procedure, agrees with and adopts the rule adopted by Cashion. See
alsoHartv. CreditServ. Co., Inc., 2014 WL 5293600, *3 (D. Colo. 2014)("Plaintiffs mere receipt
of a 1099-C form did not constitute extinguishment of his underlying debt."); Mennes v. Capital
One, NA., 2014 WL 1767079, at *6 (W.D. Wis. 2014) ("Given that the regulation requires the filing
ofForm 1099-C regardless whether the debt has actually been discharged, and that actual discharge
ofthe debt is only one of the identifiable events that triggers the filing of a 1099-C form, I find the
IRS interpretationpersuasive and agree with the majority ofcourts addressing this issue that without
additional evidence, the filing of a 1099-C form does not by itself evidence debt cancellation as a
matter of'Iaw."); Ware v. Banko!Am. Corp., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1329,1341 (N.D. Ga. 2014) ("Plaintiff
has failed to point the court to. any documentary or testamentary evidence, or binding or even
persuasive legal authority to support his claim that the 1099-C extinguished his obligation to pay
the debt, or that Defendant cancelled or forgave his debt. .."); United States v. Reed, 2010 WL
3656001, at *2 (B.D. Tenn. 2010) ("However, a Form 1099-C, as a matter oflaw, does not operate
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to legally discharge a debtor from liability on the claim that is described in the form. "); Capital One,
NA. v.Massey, 2011 WL3299934, at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2011)("Withrespecttothefirstissue, a 1099-C
is issued to comp1y with IRS reporting requirements. I.R.S. Ltr. Ru1.2005-D207, 2005 WL 3561135
(Dec. 30,2005). The IRS does not view a 1099-C as a legal admission that a debtoris absolved from
liability for a debt. Id. The IRS's interpretation ofregulations over which it has authority are given
great deference. See Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. NaturalRes. De! Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45,
104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Thus, this court adopts the view that a 1099-C does not
discharge debtors from liability. Therefore, the fact that Plaintiff issued a 1099-e in relation to the
Borrowers' indebtedness is irrelevant and does not raise a genuine issue ofmaterial fact in this suit.")
The regulation and the Form are both clear and unequivocal - the issuance of the 1099-C
signifies either an actual discharge or some other identifiable event. It is a "means of satisfying a
reporting obligation to the IRS; it is not a means of accomplishing an actual discharge of debt."
Cashion, 720 F.3d at 179; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-1. The Form does not, in and of itself,
effectuate a discharge, nor does it constitute evidence of a discharge, especiallyin this case where
the form made clearthatthe reason for the issuance ofthe Form was due to "Identifiable Event 'H',"
which signified the "expiration of the non-payment testing period" and not an actual discharge,
cancellation or extinguishment. Compare 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-l(b)(2)(H) to 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-
1(b)(2)(A)-(G).
Defendant relies on the minority view - that the Form constitutes some evidence of a
discharge. At oral argument, Defendant acknowledged that the only case ofwhichhe was aware that
similarly involved a sub-part H identifiable event, is AmtrustBankv. Fossett, 224 PJd 935 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2009). There, the court concluded that the "issuance of the Form 1099-e is prima facie
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evidence that it had discharged their debt within the meaning of Arizona law." ld., at 937. This
Court rejects that case and the minority view, for two reasons. First and foremost, that conclusion
is at odds with the plain language and meaning of the IRS regulations and procedures. Second, in
AmtrustBank, that court addressed a specific provision ofArizona law governing discharges.
Defendant also relies heavily upon In re Reed, 492 B.R. 261 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2013).
There, however, the court expressly excluded the subpart H identifiable event provision from its
analysis: "Subsections (b)(2)(i)(H) and (b)(2)(iv) concern a non-payment testing period consisting
of a minimum of 36 months, increased by any months during which a creditor is precluded from
engaging in collection activity due to bankruptcy or other applicable law, and hasnobearingonthe
court's determination." Id. at 267 (emphasis added.) So, that case does not provide support for
Defendant's position here.
The bottom line is that the majority view is consistent with the IRS regulations and reporting
scheme; the minority view is not. This is especially so in this case - where the noted reason for the
Form is not an actual discharge, extinguishment or cancellation, 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-l(b)(2)(A)-
(G), but for an altogether different reason. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-l(b)(2) (H). Accordingly, the Court
agrees with the majority view and rejects the notion that the issuance of the Form effectuated a
discharge, or otherwise resulted in a discharge ofDefendant' s obligation, or that the issuance ofthe
Form constitutes any evidence of a discharge.
III. Analysis of Other Evidence to Determine Whether a Discharge Occurred
Having concluded that the issuance ofthe Form itself did not effectuate a discharge, and is
not, standing alone, evidence ofPlaintiff' s discharge, the Court must now determine whether there
are any other facts from which a fact-finder could conclude that Plaintiff has discharged Defendant's
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debt and!or given up the right to collect on the amount owed from Defendant. See Cashion, 720 F.3d
at 181 (noting that its holding is limited to cases "where the l099-e Form is the only evidence of
debt discharge before the Court.") Defendant relies on three pieces of evidence: 1) the written-in
language on the Form; 2) Plaintiff's internal charge offrequest; and 3) Plaintiffs alleged inaction.
Plaintiff disputes that any of these three facts constitute any evidence of a discharge or an
intent to discharge. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration (Goodwin Decl.), and supplemental
declaration from Rex Goodwin, its Vice President of Consumer Loan Servicing. (PI.' s Combined
Reply, Ex. A, Goodwin Supp. Decl.). Mr.Goodwin stated, among other things, that "Zions issued
the 1099-C solely for purposes ofcomplying with applicable tax laws and had no intent to waive its
claims against Crapo." Goodwin Decl.at ~ 15. And, that "Zions has never at any time taken any
action to grant an actual release forgiveness or discharge ofCrapo's debt to Zions." (Pi's Combined
Reply, Ex. A, Goodwin Supp. Decl. . at ~ 8). Mr. Goodwin also declared that none of the actions
at issue here were ever intended to waive Plaintiffs right to collect against Defendant. Id., at ~~ 6-8.
Defendant has failed to rebut any of Goodwin's testimony with any other evidence, aside from the
three facts they rely upon, and so those facts are deemed admitted, unless any ofthe other pieces of
evidence controverts that testimony. See D.R.C.P. 56(a)(4). Each will be addressed.
A. The Form l099-C
Defendant argues that even under the holding from Cashion, the Form evidences a discharge
because in the "Debt Description" box, Plaintiff stated: "FORGIVEN DEBT AMT 3 YRS NO
PAYMENT." Defendant argues that Plaintiff was only required to providethe type of indebtedness
- i.e., "consumer debt" - and that by using the term "forgiven" indicates an intent to discharge.
The Court is not persuaded by this argument. That document, taken as a whole, is simply
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a reporting mechanism to the IRS. See supra. It reflects an accounting procedure that is not
intended to be a means whereby a creditor can extinguish a debt or whereby a debtor may be
exonerated from all payment. When viewed in the totality - given the general purpose ofthe form,
along with the fact that it references an identifiable event (H) that excludes an extinguishment,
cancellation or discharge - this document cannot be construed as evidence of Plaintiffs discharge
of defendant's debt or ofPlaintiff s intent to waive its right to collect from Defendant; nor can any
specific language in the Form be construed to constitute evidence of a discharge. Seesupra.
Again, the Court notes that the majority view of the reported cases is that even where the
"Identifiable Event" is noted to be "a discharge, extinguishment or cancellation" that does not
effectuate a discharge, and does not result in a lender's loss of collection rights. Cashion, supra.
If a lender reports a "discharge, extinguishment, or cancellation" through a 1099-C form, and that
does not create a factual dispute of a discharge, neither can the use of the word "forgiven" on that
same, Form. Moreover, although the notation on the Form uses the phrase "forgiven debt," it
references "3 yrs," which is a reference to the testing period in Identifiable Event Code H. See
Goodwin Supp. at '7 (wherein he stated that the "forgiven debt" language was used "not because
ofan actual forgiveness, but simply as another description ofthe expiration ofthe 36 month testing
period without receiving a payment.")
In sum, the use ofthe phrase "forgiven debt" - in the context of a document that is intended
to be an IRS reporting tool, and on which the "identifiable event" references something other than
an actual discharge - simply does not result in the cancellation or discharge of the debt, nor did it
deprive Plaintiff of its right to pursue a claim against Defendant.
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B. The Charge orr Request
Plaintiffnext points to the"ChargeOffRequest"("ChargeOff') formdatedJanuary6,2011.
(Def.'s Mem. In Supp, Ex C). That is an internal Zions document that was not communicated to
Defendant at the time. The plain language of Plaintiff's internal document, however, does not
provideevidence of a discharge,or an acknowledgment byPlaintiff that it was givingup its right to
collect a deficiency from Defendant. In fact, that documentexpresslystatesjust the opposite:
[Defendant] has indicatedhe wantsto repaythe loan but does not have the financial means
to do so at this time. It is recommended this loanbe chargedoffdue to a lackofcollateral
and transferred to Recovery Departmentfor further collection efforts. An assetsearchwill
be completedto determineif assets exist to attach to a Judgment.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
The ChargeOff documentmakesclearthat althoughPlaintiff may"chargeoff' the loan for
purposes of internal accounting, it had every intention of trying to collect on the loan, after
ascertaining whethercollectioneffortswould be fruitful or futile. The ChargeOff documentdoes
not provide anyevidence supportingan actualdischarge; nor does it conveyan intent, by Plaintiff,
to relinquishits right to collect from Defendant.
C. The Alleged Period of Delay
Finally, Defendant arguesthat Plaintiff's delaysupportedan intent to discharge. Plaintiff's
last communication with Defendantto collecton the loan was in 2010, and it internally issued the
ChargeOff in January,2011. Therewas a period of inactivityfor approximately threeyears- from
January2011until the Form was issuedin early2014. plaintiff filed this lawsuitin October, 2014.
Defendantcitesno authoritythatsupportstheirposition- whicheffectivelywouldshortenPlaintiff's
6-yearstatuteof limitations governing this contractaction.
In response,Plaintiff argues that a periodof inactiondoes not constitute evidence of intent
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to discharge and that the parties' contract expressly bars this argument. The Home Equity Line
Credit Agreement and Disclosure ("Note"), (Def. 's Mem, ill Supp. Ex. AI), contains the following
provision:
Delay in Enforcement. We may delay or waive the enforcement of any of our rights under
this Agreement without losing that right or any other right. Ifwe delay or waive our rights,
we may enforce that right at any time in the future without advance notice. Forexample, not
terminatingyouraccountfor non-paymentwillnotbeawaiver ofourrighttoterminate your
accountin thefuture ifyou have notpaid
Id. at 5 (emphasis added.)' In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff waived this provision,
relying on ASC Utah, Inc. v. WolfMountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184, which
involved a dispute between a lessor, Wolf Mountain, and lessee, ASCU. After ASCU sued Wolf
Mountain in state court, and after a few years of litigation, Wolf Mountain moved to compel
arbitration. ASCU argued that it waived the right to arbitrate, but Wolf Mountain relied on a no-
waiver provision in the parties' lease, similar to the provision at issue here." The Court held that
Wolf Mountain waived that provision - but not due to inaction or delay, but rather because its
affirmative conduct in litigating for three years was "inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate." Id.,
~40.
Here, Defendant presents no facts to support a waiver of the "Delay in Enforcement"
provision, other than the alleged delay itself. Allowing a party to avoid the consequences of a no
3 Plaintiffalso arguesthat this provision bars all of Defendant'swaiver and estoppelarguments because
even if Plaintiff did something that couldbe construed to waiveits right to collectfromDefendant, they would
nonetheless be excusedfrom that waiverand couldnonetheless "enforcethat rightat anytime in the future." ld.
Although that is a plausibleinterpretation of thatprovision, that issuewas not fullybriefed, so the Court does not
base itsruling on that provisionalone.
4 That provisionprovided: "Failureof a partyhereto to exercise anyrighthereundershall not be deemed a
waiverof any such right and shall not affectthe rightof suchpartyto exercise at somefuturetime said rightor any
otherright it mayhave hereunder. ld., ~ 37.
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delay provision by arguing inaction - as opposed to affirmative acts constituting a waiver as in Wolf
Mountain - would render the provision meaningless. Stated differently, a provision that
contemplates that a party may delay, and should not be penalized for a delay, cannot be nullified by
a delay; such a result would be nonsensical and would render the provision meaningless. Encon
Utah. LLCv, FluorAmesKraemer, LLC,2009 U'I' 7, ~ 28 ("In interpreting a contract, we look for
a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision meaningless.") The
Court'cannot, under the applicable rules of construction, interpret the parties' contract as suggested
by Defendant. See id.
In light of the clear and unambiguous contract provision permitting Plaintiff to delay
enforcement, any delay on Plaintiffs part cannot give rise to the fact or inference that Defendant
was entitled to have his loan discharged. Here, where Defendant argues no other facts in support of
his argument, the Delay inEnforcement provision trumps Defendant's argument that Plaintiff's
" :'
alleged delay constimtes evidence of adischarge.
Accordingly, all of the facts before the Court, even when considered in the light most
favorable to Defendant, does not support a discharge ofDefendant' s obligation, and does not create
a dispute of fact that can defea] Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
IV. Analysis Qf CrapQls Defens@j
Even though Defendant cannot demonstrate an actual discharge of his mdebtedness, the
Court must nonetheless determine whether either ofDefendant's affirmative defenses - waiver or
estoppel- can defeat Plaintiff's claim; or, at least whether there are questions offact that preclude
judgmentat this time. The Court thus analyzes whether, based upon Plaintiff's actions, it has waived
its right to collect on the indebtedness owed, or is estopped from asserting that right.
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A. Waiver
The touchstone of the doctrine of waiver is an intentto relinquish a known right. Rees v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah1991)("We havestatedthat [a]waiver
is the intentionalrelinquishment ofa knownright") Here, Defendantarguesthat throughPlaintiff's
actions, it intentionally relinquished its right to collect from Defendant. However, there is no
evidenceto supportthat Plaintiff intended to giveup its collectionrights viz-a-vizDefendant.
There is not one factbefore this Courtthat demonstrates an intentby Plaintiff to waiveits
right; in fact the record is entirelyto the contrary. First,Mr. Goodwintestified that Plaintiff never
intendedto waive its rights. Second, the Form doesnot constitute evidence of an intent to waive;
it is anaccounting document that is distinctfromthe legaldetermination ofwhethera discharge has
occurred, and, in this case,referencesan eventthat is not an actualdischarge. Third,the language
onthe ChargeOffdemonstrates just the opposite- thatPlaintiff intendedto pursuecollection efforts
againstDefendantafter it determined whetherDefendant had assetsto pay so that its efforts would
not be futile. Finally, Plaintiffs alleged period of inaction cannot support a waiver. Id. ("[m]ere
silence is not a waiverunlessthere is some dutyor obligation to speak.")
In sum,thereis noevidencedemonstrating thatPlaintiff intendedto waiveits rightto collect
the indebtedness owedfromDefendant; conversely, thereis ampleevidencethat Plaintiffintended
NOT to waive that right.
B. Estoppel.
A partyasserting an estoppeltheoryhas to provethreeelements: 1) a statement, admission,
act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; 2) reasonable action or
inaction by the otherparty taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission,
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act or failure to act; and 3) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party
to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. Youngblood v. Auto
Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ~ 14, 158 P.3d 1088.
Based on the undisputed facts, Defendant cannot prove any of these elements. First,
Plaintiff's currentposition - in seeking to collect from Defendant - is not inconsistentwith its prior
actions. As stated above, all of its prior actions demonstrated an intent to collect from Defendant;
neither the Form, the Charge Off, nor Plaintiffs alleged delay' is inconsistent with that intent.
Stated differently, there is nothing in Plaintiffs course of conduct that would indicate that its
decision to now pursue collection efforts against the Defendant is inconsistent with any of its prior
actions.
Second, Defendant argues that he reasonably relied on Plaintiff's alleged "discharge" in the
1099-C Form to his detriment by paying taxes on his gain." However, it appears clear form the tax
scheme - expressed in regulations and on the Form itself- that he was/is not required to pay taxes
until the loan had been actually discharged, and that the Form did not do that. In fact, the I.R.S.
instructions on the face ofthe Form clearly instruct taxpayers to pay taxes notwhen an "identifiable
event has occurred but [when] the debt has ... actually been discharged." (Def.'s Mem. In Supp.
OfSumm. J. Ex. A2, Instructions for Debtor )("Ifan identifiable event has occurred but the debt has
not actually been dischar~ed,than include any discharged debt in your income in theyear that it is
5 First Inv. Co. v, Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980) ("[I]n order for silenceto work an estoppel,
there mustbe a legal dutyto speak,or there mustbe something willful or culpable in the silencewhich allows
anotherto place himselfin an unfavorable positionbyreasonthereof." (citationand quotations omitted)).
6 Other than the 1099-CForm, there wereno communications from Plaintiffto Defendant concerning the
allegeddischarge. Accordingly, that is the onlyrepresentation that he couldhave relieduponto his detriment, and is
the onlycommunication that can formthe basis of an estoppel.
-14-
00567
actually discharged[.]" (emphasisadded)). Accordingly, becausethe Formdidnotconveyanactual
discharge, Defendant was not requiredto paytaxes;andhe is not requiredto sopayunlessanduntil
an actualdischarge occurs. Thus,Defendantcannotarguethat he relied on the Form, or anyother
actiontakenbyPlaintiff,whenthe documentpresentedto himplainlyindicatedtohimthathe should
not have actedin that manner.
GoldStandard, Inc. v. GettyOilCo., 915 P.2d 1060(Utah 1996),is instructiveonthe issue.
There, the court held that a plaintiff could not rely on his belief, which was based on oral
representations madebythe defendantwhenhehad"contrarywritteninformation" availabletohim.
Id. at 1068. It follows that a person cannotrelyonhis mistaken subjective beliefregarding his tax
obligations, whenthewrittenformprovidedtohimshouldhave disabusedhim ofsuchanobligation.
Accordingly, Defendant's mistakein paying his taxes appearsto havebeen dueto a mistakeoflaw
on his part; it was not caused by anything Plaintiffdid. Thus, it follows that Defendant did not
suffer to his detriment as a result a/anything Plaintiffdid." There is no basis for an estoppel.
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
To summarize, the Form did not discharge Defendant's debt. Moreover, no other evidence
submittedto the Courtsupportsthat Plaintiffdischarged Defendant's debt. Finally, Defendant has
failed to provethat Plaintiff has waivedits right to collect from him or is estoppedfrom asserting
that right. Thus, the amountof the note remains dueandpayableto PlaintiffandPlaintiffis entitled
to summaryjudgment as a matter of law.
7 Moreover, Plaintiffargues that to the extent Defendant has paid taxes,he mayseek a refundto undo any
harm. The recordwas less than completeon this argument, and so the Courtdoesnot base its decisionon that
argument. Similarly, Defendantarguesthat it wouldbeunfairto allowZionsto collectfromDefendant after having
received its owntax benefitby writingoff the loan. However, there is no evidence in the record to supportthis
contention.
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Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for SummaryJudgment is GRANTED,
2. Defendant's Motion for SummaryJudgment is DENIED.
3. Plaintiff should draft and circulate a proposed Final Judgment to the Court in the
amount of $289,069.86 through May 31, 2015, plus interest of $18.77 per day
thereafter, as supported by Mr. Goodwin's Declaration.
4. Otherwise, no further order is required.
I'1D
So ORDEREDthis2~d8.y of January, 2016.
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CHARGE OFF REQUEST~
lfranchJept. Name Submitted by: BranchlDept. Number IDate
41 Payson EricA Allman UT-2805-0183 1/6/11
..> Security/Collateral (description, value & basis for value)2ndTDSFRlocaled In SaratogaSprings, UT, Originalappraised valuewas$714,000
Borrower Name Shayne Crapo ~ as of 8/21/06with 88% FMV at $628,320leavingBankequityof $242,000 and
$158,320at 88% FMV less senior lien, Senior lienforeclosedpriorto loancoming to
Last Address CreditManagement leavingloanunsecured,
FICO SCORE AT IN/A Iunknown I IN/ALast Phone Number ORIGINATION Comoanv Ouaranlcr Guarantor
Credit Score Appr'd I Unknown ISocial Security Number
CreditOfficer Approved IILD I I Unknown IBorrower Name o OfticerName Landino Limil
Additional Approval IN/A I N/A I
Last Address 0 Acorovino Officer Lendin limit
Additional Approval IN/A I N/A I
Last Phone Number ~oorovino Officer (Lending Llmil)
Social Security Number Committee Approval IN/A (Committee Name)
FRB I 760 I SIC 9999 INAICS I 99999 Collateral I 6320 ICRACode NIA IHMOA? I [2] y IReg Q? [2]~ PolicyException ICode CODE CODE Code YIN .; N YIN cede None
Customer& Note# OriginalDate OriginalAmount CurrentPrincipalBalance Charge
12/29/2006 250,000.00 250,000.00 o DOWN 00FF
RevorsedInterestAmount Total Amounl of non-accrual interest Date placedon non-accrual Amount.
655.89 3,880.23 11/19/10 /' ;;0,000.00)
Type (ILD, RE, Corn'l, MC, 00) SIC# DaysPast Due DateLast Paid \. PrevioJ.ls..el1arge Downs:
Date:
ILD 9999 128 9/1/2010 Amount:
12-MonthHislory of Loan Grades 18, 6 DealerPaper? 11y r.;lN Recourse? Ily I.;IN ILegal Feesor Otherto collect, $ IUnknown
Reason For Charge Off Request (Describe the situation)
The ioan was transferred to Credit Management and downgraded in a timely manner. There were no policy exceptions noted at origination. The ioan was
originally secured by a 1st TO SFR In Saratoga Springs, UT, which was later determined to be a 2nd TO behind a senior lien of $472,000 with Wells Fargo.
The property was originally valued at $714,000 on 8/21/06 with 88% of FMV at $628,320 leaving the Bank equity of $242,000 and $156,320 at 88% FMV iess
the senior lien. Attached is a memo from Cindy McGinnis of Credit Management dated 10/9/08, detailing the loan history including the discovery of the lien
position and the subsequent issues/resolutions concerning them. During a 1/6/11 phone conversation with Mr. Crapo it was confirmed the properties had
been foreclosed in August 2010 and he is still in litigation against Wells Fargo and Lawyers Title (now out of business) concerning a title claim against the
original collateral. He has indicated he wants to repay the ioan but does not have the financiai means to do SO at this time. It is recomn;e~~d/t~an be
charged0rtttmt~a~tr~2.s~io~~.entforfurthercollecti02:Zff~rts.M~~ (.Vl:.-"-"-~isobe noted since the Bank had nofrequested notification shoukffo~m~ce,n~I;;d;-';';;required to notify the Bank of
any proceedings.
OCC OR CREDIT MANAGEMENT REQUEST: No
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